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I do not propose in this thesis to compare the lav
of contributory negligence with the doctrines of comparative
negligence. This would necessitate my going into the subject
of contributory negligence too deeply. I simply intend to
discuss the rules of comparative negligence as laid down by
the courts in which those rules were and are law. In order
to do this I am forced to touch upon the subject of contri-
butory negligence, but shall only go so far as will enable me
to point out their chief dintinctions.
The work will be divided into four parts. The
first part will treat generally of the subject of contribu-
tory negligence. In part two I shall discuss comparative
negligence. In part three will be considered the law as it
obtained in Illinois, and in part four, as it obtains in
Georgia.
COMPARAT IVE NEGLI GENCE
IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
"To frame a definition of any legal term which
shall be both positively and negatively accurate is possible
only to those who, having legislative authority, can adapt
the law to their own definition. Other persons have to take
the law as they find it and rarely indeed is it in their pow-
er to frame any definition to'which exception may not justly
be taken." With such an assertion staring me in the face and
coming from no less a writer than Baron Lindley, there is no
wonder that I abandon all attempt to formulate a definition
of a term so difficult as "Negligence". I shall content my-
self with an enumeration of several definitions of a few of
our most respected authorities.
Baron Alderson says, "Negligence is the omission to
do something which a reasonable man, guided by those consi-
derations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human af-
fairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and rea-
sonable man would not do." (1] Exch. 784)
Wharton suggests: "Negligence in its civil relations
is such an inadvertant imperfection, by a responsible human
agent, in the discharge of a legal duty, as immediately pro-
duces, in an ordinary and natural sequence, a damage to ano-
ther. The inadvertency or want of due consideration of duty
is the injuria, on which, when naturally followed by the
3damnum, the suit is based." (Wharton on Negligence, Sec. 3)
"A negligence", says Mr. Bruce, (I Ky. L. J. 469),
"is the proximate cause of an injury, when it consists of
such an act or omission, on the part of a reasonable human
being, as in ordinary and natural sequence, immediately re-
sults in such injury."
Mr. Beach says, "Legal negligence consists for the
most part in the breach or omission of a legal duty which may
be either unintentional, as is uaually the case, or intention-
al, as is sometimes the case." And further on he says,- "Be-
tween negligence and contributory negligence there is the
difference between species and genus, and it is accordingly
far easier to state with tolerable precision what contribu-
tory negligence is, than to construct a satisfactory defini-
tion of the simple term 'negligence'. ..... I therefore -pro-
pose the following:- Contributory negligence in its legal
signification, is such an act or omission on the part of a
plaintiff, amounting to a want of ordinary care, as concurring
or co-operating with the negligent act of the defendant, is a
proximate cause or ocaasion of the injury complained of."
(Beach on Contributory Negligence, Secs. 6 - 7) And to con-
stitute contributory negligence there must be a want of ordi-
nary care on the part of the plaintiff, and a proximate con-
nection between that and the injury.
The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, (Vol.
IV, p. 17), defines contributory negligence thus:- "Contri-
butory negligence is a want of ordinary care upon the part of
a person injured by tV, nrtioriole ne.,li-A ,,ce of another,
coml]lnilir 1nd nnncurrin with that negln'eaun, nr eontri-
butinm- to the iT.-iury as P, proximate cause thereof, without
"hich the iv.Jury would not bave ovnrred."
Havin, !earne( wP3 t contrib'te, 'eglinerne is, I
shall now endeavor to asnertain ,7bat its position in the law
of obligation is, and what that position amounts to.
When ar injury results to one of two parties from
the mutual and concurring negligence of both of them, the one
who suffers the injury can recover nothing by way of compen-
sation or damages. The contributory nelii-ence of the in-
,iured -,arty is a defense, and a complete defense, to the ac-
tion, because "the law has no scales to determine, in such
cases, whose wronr-doing weighed most in the compound that
occasioned the ,-iischief. The common law refuses either to
apportion the damages as best it may, -yiving to each man ac-
cording to his deserts, as far as they can be ascertained, or
to divide the damages equally between the parties An fault,
as in the rustien judicium of the admiralty, and'the reason
why in cases of mutual concurri-n-, nenligence, neither party
can maintain an action a-ainst the other', said Mr. Justice
Strong, (41 Pa. St. 499), 'is not that the wrong of the one
is set off against the wrong of the other; it is, that the
law cannot measure how much the damage suffered is attribu-
table to the plaintiff's own fault.'"
The foregoing is substantially a correct exposition
of the rule of contributory negligence as it is laid down in
connon law jurisdictions today, except that of Georgia.
These principles which govern in the law of contri-
butory negligence were known to the civil law of Rome, (Whar-
ton on Negligence, 2d Ed. Sec. 300; Pollock on Torts 484),
and most likely from this source caine the rule into he com-
mon law. (Beach oil Contributory Negligence, Sec. 1) As ap-
plicable in cases of tortious injury by negligence, the doc-
trine of contributory negligeice substantially as it now pre-
vails, was first ennunciated in Butterfield v. Forrester,
(11 East 60). This case was as follows: It was an action on
the case for obstructing a highway, by means of which obstruc-
tions the plaintiff, who was riding along the road, was thrown
down with his horse and injured. At the trial before Baile,
J. it appeared that defendant, for the purpose of making some
repairs to his house, which wad close by the roadside at one
end of the town, had put up a pole across this part of the
street, a free passage being left by another branch or street
in the same direction: that the plaintiff left a public house
not far distant from the place of the injury, at eight o'clock
in the evening in August, when they were just lighting the
candles, but while there was light enough left to discern the
obstruction one hundred yards distant: and the witness who
proved this said tihat if the plaintiff had not been riding
very hard he might have observed and avoided the obstruction.
The plaintiff, however, who was riding violently, did not ob-
serve it, and fell with his horse and was much hurt, in con-
sequence of the accident. On this evidence Bailey, J. direct-
ed the jury, that if any person riding with reasonable and
ordinary care could have seen and avoided the obstruction,
and if they were satisfied that the plaintiff was riding
along the street extremely fast, and without ordinary care,
they should find a verdict for the defendant, which they did.
In the Court of King's Bench it was contended that this de-
cision was wrong, and that plaintiff was entitled to recover.
But the case was thus disposed of by Lord Ellenborough, C. J.:
"A party is not to cast himself upon an obstruction which has
been made by the fault of another, and avail himself of it,
if he do not himself use common and ordinary caution to be in
the right. In cases of persons riding on what is considered
to be the wrong side of the road, that would not authorize
another purposely to ride up against him. One person being
in fault will not dispense with another's ordinary care for
himself. Two things must concur to support this action,- an
obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no
want of ordinary care to avoid on the part of the plaintiff."
This is the case in which the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence was first announced, and the rule thus laid
down in 1809 by the English Court of the King's Bench, is now
the authority on this question.
There is another English case which is frequently
cited as authority for some of the holdings in the different
common law jurisdictions,- Davies v. Mann, (10 I.. & 7. 546),
frequently referred to as the "Donkey Case". Here the plain-
tiff negligently placed hik donhey in a highway with his feet
7tethered, so that he could not get out of the way of vehicles.
While the donkey was standing in this condition, the defend-
ant's wagon came along at a brisk pace and negligently ran
over the donkey and killed him. The rule was laid down,-
that if the defendant could, by the exercise of ordinary care,
have avoided the effects of plaintiff's negligence, tIe plain-
tiff might recover. The jury held this to be the case and
the plaintiff was allowed to recover.
This case was decided in 1842, and was thought by
some to overrule Butterfield v. Forrester, and Mr. Beach in
his book on Contributory Negligence, (Sec. 10), says,- "In
this case ..... an entirely different rule is laid down, one
,vhich is not only subversive of the reasonable rule declared
in Butterfield v. Forrester, but which practically repudiates
the entire doctrine of contributory negligence." Butterfield
v. Forrester holds:- If plaintiff by the exercise of ordi-
nary care could have avoided the effects of defendant's neg-
ligence, Pe cannot recover. In Davies v. Mann the rule is
put thus:- If the defendant could, by the use of ordinary
care, :have avoided the plaintiff's negligence, the plaintiff
can recover. These holdings seem inconsistent, but if each
rule be a: plied to its own statement of facts, then it will
be correctly applicable, and the principle of Butterfi .d v.
Forrester will generally apply when the plaiitiff's negli-
gence has been subsequent to the defendant's negligence; and
the principle of Davies v. Mann will generally apply when
defendant's negligence has been subsequent to tn.e plaintiff's
iejglibence.
If eaci rule be considered with its own fact6 and
circumstances, it 'ill amount to tis:- Ti-at Le is to be
responsible fo: the injury, whose riegligence was the proximate
cause of it. The attempt to reconcile these two holdings
without considering the approximateness or remoteness of the
cause of the injury, led BreeseJ. of Illinois to blunder
into the quicksands, and Lumpkin, J. of Georgia to entangle
himself in the meshes of comparative negligence.
CHAPTER II.
C OMPARAT IVE NEGLI GENCE.
"Comparative negligence is that doctrine in the law
of negligence by which the negligence of the parties is com-
pared in the degrees of 'sligeft', 'ordinary' and 'gross' neg-
ligence, and a recovery permitted, notwithstanding the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff, when the negligence of
the plaintiff is slight and the negligence of the defendant
is gross; but refused when the plaintiff has been 6uilty of a
want of ordinary care contributing to his injury, or when the
negligence of the defendant is not gross, but only ordinary
or slight, when compared, under the circumstances of the case,
with the contributory negligence of the plaintiff." (Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 367)
Mr. Beach declares the theory of comparative negli-
gence to be as follows:- "Upon considerations of public pol-
icy and general convenience the common law has sturdily re-
fused either to enforce contribution between tort feasors,
or to parcel out the damages between the parties in cases of
injury from mutual and concurring neglect. In those juris-
dictions, however, where the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence obtains, the courts have proceeded upon an exactly
contrary theory. They assume it to be at once possible and
judicious to compare the negligence of the plaintiff with the
negligence of the defendant in these actions, for the purpose
of determining where the ultimate liability for the injury
shall rest, and if upon such a comparison judicially insti-
tuted , trhe negligence of the plaintiff appears to have been
slight, while that of the defendant was gross, the plaintiff
may have his action. This is something more than a modifica-
tion of the rule of contributory negligence. Under its opera-
tion contributory negligence is no longer a defense. It
completely ignores the principle of compensation in awarding
damages, and proceeds upon the theory of punishment. It con-
tradicts the rule it assumes to qualify. The rule is that
contributory negligence is a defense. The qualification is
that it is not a defense. Reduced to a canon it amounts to
this:- Slight negligence on the part of a plaintiff, al-
though never so much contributory negligence, is not a de-
fense to gross negligence on the part of the defendant."
(Beach Con. Neg. Sec. 75)
This is not quite right as to the theory of compar-
ative negligence. The theory of comparative negligence is
just the same as the theory of contributory negligence,- not
to punish but to indemnify and to allow the person injured to
recover when he is not injured by his own fault or wrong.
But as to what comparative negligence is, Beach is correct.
For this is just what comparative negligence purports to be,-
a comparison of the negligent acts of plaintiff and defendant.
The law recognizes only three degrees of negligence,
and the negligence of each party is to be measured by a scale
of three degrees of negligence. The process of measuring and
comparing is to be done with reference to the rights, duties
and obligations of the respective parties, and under the pec-
uliar circumstances in evidence. And the same evidence which
determines the one "gross" and th;e other "ordinary" or "s-ight,
fixes their relative degrees with reference to each other.
These debrees of negliojnce are "slight", "ordinary" and
"gross". The negligence of the plaintiff is compared with
the negligence of the defendant and if there be one whole de-
gree intervening between the negligence of each, then there
may be a recovery.
"The comparison of the negligence of plaintiff and
defendant must be made by determining whether under the cir-
cumstances, the negligence of each is slight, ordinary or
gross, in the technical and legal sense of the terms, and
comparing the degree in ,ihich the one has been negligent with
the degree of negligence on the part of the other." (Vol.
III, Am. & En. Enc. of Law, p. 368)
In making this comparison, as above stated, the
circumstances of the case must be considered, and the compar-
ison made in the light of the circumstances. (103 Ill. 512;
115 Ill. 358) When, upon such a comparison of the negligence
of the plaintiff and the defendant, it appears that the con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff is slight, and the neg-
ligence of the defendant gross; that is, when one whole de-
gree of negligence intervenes between the slight negligence
of plaintiff and gross negligence of the defendant,- the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover.
The plaintiff cannot recover if the negligence of
the defendant be slight or ordinary. The defendant's negli-
gence must be gross. (92 Ill. 351; 92 Ill. 141; 82 Ill. 198)
The plaintiff will not be permitted to recover for an injury,
the result of mere negligence upon the part of the defendant,
when his own failure to exercise ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances, contributed to the injury. (103 Ill. 512; 115
Ill. 358)
The doctrine of comparative negligence was first
announced by Breese, J. of Supreme Court of Illinois. (20
Ill. 478) He tried to reconcile the holding in the case of
Davies v. Mann with the generally accepted rules of contri-
butory negligence. The two essential elements of contribu-
tory negligence are, (1) a want of ordinary care on the part
of the plaintiff, and (2) the want of this ordinary care must
be proximately connected with the injury. He got these two
elements mixed up or did not consider the latter at all.
Hence his attempt was abortive and comparative negligence was
the outcome. Comparative negligence is no longer the law of
Illinois. It was practically overruled in Calumet Iron Co.
v. Morton, (115 Ill. 358), and expressly denied in Eitz v.
Dougherty, (153 Ill. 163). It does not exist in Kentucky,
(Beach, Con. Neg. Secs. 99 - 102; Kentucky R. R. v. Admini-
strator, 79 Ky. 160; Adam v. R. R., 21 Am. & Eng. R. R.
Cases 380)
A misapprehension of the rule in Kentucky has arisen
from the use by the Kentucky court of the terms "gross" and
"wilful" negligence, in cases which arose under the Kentucky
statute providing for the recovery of punitive damages when
death results from the wilful misconduct of the defendant.
In such cases contributory negligence was held no defense.
(Beach Con. Neg. Secs. 99 - 102; 79 Ky. 160)
In Tennessee a peculiar modification of the la'; of
contributory negligence exists, but it is not comparative
negligence. (Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. III, p. 136;
Beach, Cont. Neg. Sec. 97) The rule 'ere is, that negligence
on the part of the plaintiff contributing to his injury as a
proximate cause thereof will bar a recovery, but that although
guilty of some negligence, yet if he could not by the exer-
cise of ordinary care, have avoided the consequences of de-
fendant's negligence, ne may recover, but his negligence will
be taken into consideration in mitigation of damages. But
when both parties are equally blamable, there can be no
recovery. (R. R. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk. 347; citing Whirly v.
Whitehead, 1 Herd. 610)
The Supreme Court of the United States adheres to
the rule of contributory negligence, (R. R. v. Lockwood, 17
Wall. 357; R. R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 66), and the courts of
most of the states have expressly repudiated the doctrines of
comparative negligence. (0'Keefe v. R. R., 32 Ia. 467; R. R.
v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274; Potter v. Warren, 91 Pa. St. 367;
Wilds v. R. R., 24 N. Y. 432; R. R. v. Righter, 42 N. J. L.
180; Gothard v. R. R., 67 Ala. 114; 21 Wis. 377; 49 Tex. 573;
Marble v. Ross, 124 Mass. 44; Digby v. Iron Co., 6 Bush. (Ky.)
166; Peary v. R. R., 29 Kans. 169; Morgan v. R. R., 31 Kan. 77)
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Comparative negligence obtains in no oth-Ler juris-
diction except that of Goorgia, at thc present time. And it
is not the settled law of tiiat state. It is substantially
correct to say that no fixed rule obtains in that state.
CHAPTER III.
ILL I NOT S
Comparative negligence, wedge like, divided the
reign of the law of contributory negligence into two periods
in this State. Although it is not the law of Illinois at the
present time, still it was there first announced and held to
be the law. Therefore it is necessary that I should enter
into a discussion of the doctrine as interpreted by the Sup-
reme Court of Illinois, before entering into the lair of "this
pernicious and pestiferous doctrine",- Georgia.
Previous to the year 1858 the established doctrine
of contributory negligence was in vogue in Illinois; as in
every other common law jurisdiction. The first intimation of
the rule of comparative negligence was given by Breese, C. J.
in the Jacobs Case, (20 Ill. 478). This was an action on the
case for the use of Frederick Jacobs, for injuries sustained
by being run over by a locomotive of defendant company, The
Galena and Chicago Union R. R. Co. Breese, J. wrote the
opinion. "As this case will be remanded and a new trial had,
(the judgment for plaintiff being overruled on other grounds)
it becomes necessary for the court to submit some considera-
tions on the question of negligence and the principles which
should govern it." After a review and comment on the leading
cases of contributory negligence which are authority every-
where for its doctrine, he says,- "Although these cases do
not distinctly avow this doctrine in terms, there is a vien
of it very perceptible, running throurh very narny of them, as
w'ere there are faults on both sides, the plaintiff shall re-
cover, his fault being measured by the defendant's negligence."
:!e now lays down the rule in the following language: It
will be seen from these cases, that the question of liability
does not depend absolutely on the absence of all negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, but upon the relative degree of
care or want of care, as manifested by both parties, for all
care or negligence is at best but relative, the absence of
the highest possible degree of care showing the presence of
some negligence, slight as it may be. The true doctrine,
therefore, we think is, that in proportion to the negligence
of the defendant should be measured the degree of care re-
quired of the plaintiff; that is to say, the more gross the
negligence manifested by the defendant, the less degree of
care will be required of the plaintiff to enable him to re-
cover. 77e say then, that in this as well as in all the cases,
the degrees of negligence must be measured and considered,
and whenever it shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence
is comparatively slight and that of the defendant gross, he
shall not be deprived of his action."
The rule as above remained unchallenged until the
m1arten Case, (115 7ll. 358), and was followed by a large num-
ber of decisions, although a little misunderstood by some of
them. In the case of Sweeny v. R. -F1., (52 Ill. 325), Breese,
J., who wrote the opinion in this case also, said,- "As some
misapprehension seems to exist in respect to the extent this
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court has gone in discussing the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence, it may not be amiss to review the several cases on
that subject." ::e makes practically the same argument for
the rule in this case as he did in the Jacobs Case and winds
up by laying down the doctrine in the same language used in
that case.
Scholfield, J. reannounces the rule in P. R. v.
Delaney, (82 Ill. 196),- "the rule of the court" says he,
"is that the relative degree of negligence in cases of this
kind is matter of comparison and that the plaintiff may re-
cover although his intestate was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, provided the negligence of the intestate was slight
and that of the defendant was gross in comparison with each
other; and consequently if the intestate's negligence was not
slight and that of the defendant gross in comparison with each
other, there can be no recovery." So, under the rule as laid
down above, the question of proximateness and remoteness of
the cause of the injury does not arise. 7he question seems
to be not whose negligence was the proximate cause, but was
the negligence of one party slight, and that of the other
gross? If this be so, then it means simply, did one whole
degree of negligence exist between the negligence of the
plaintiff ard that of the defendant?
In the case of C. B. ' Q. R. 11. v. Johnson, (103
Ill. 512), the court clearly states the doctrine and defines
the legal meaning of the terms "slight", "ordinary" and
"gross" negligence, saying,- "In holding the plaintiff may
recover in an action for negligence, notwithstanding he has
been guilty of contributory negligence, when his negligence
is but slight and that of the defendant gross, in comparison
with each other, it must of course be understood that the
terms 'slight' and 'c-ross' negligence are used in their legal
sense, as defined by common law judges and text writers; for
otherwise the terms would convey no definite idea of a fixed
legal rule. As defined by those judges and writers these
terms express the extremes of negligence. Beyond 'gross' or
less than 'slight' there is no degree of negligence. 'Gross,
gross', and 'grosser, gross' and 'grossest, gross', and
'slight, slight', 'slighter, slight', and 'slightest, slight',
are absurd and in a legal sense impossible terms. That is less
than slight negligence the law takes no cognizance of as a
ground of action; and beyond gross negligence the law, while
recognizing that there may be liability for trespass, because
of a particular intention to do wrong, or of a degree of wil-
ful and wanton recklessness, which authorizes the presumption
of a general intention to do wrong, recognizes no degree of
neglig-ence. The definition of gross negligence itself proves
that it is not to be the subject of comparison. it is the
want of slight diligence. Slight negligence is the want of
great diligence, and intermediate there is ordinary negli-
gence, which is defined to be the want of ordinary diligence."
The law of comparative negligence so elaborately
worked out by Lreese, j. in 1858 and followed through a long
line of decisions unchallenged by the SDupreme Court of Illi-
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nois, (20 Ill. 478; 26 Ill. 373; 26 Ill. 255; 38 Ill. 242; 46
Ill. 76; 52 Ill. 325; 68 Ill. 580; 81 Ill. 45C; 82 Ill. 196;
103 1l. 512d, remained the law in that state until 1885,
when it veceived its first impeachment.
In the :orton C'tse, (Calumet Iron Co. v. 7:orton,
115 Ill. 358), the law was thus laid dovn by O"cholfield, J.:-
"The rule in this state is, that in order to recover for in-
juries from negligence, it must be shown and alleged that the
party injured was, at the time of the injury, observing due
or ordinary care for his personal safety; and that when a
party while observing due or ordinary care for his personal
safety, is injured by the negligent acts of another, there
may be a recovery on account of such negligent acts. Tor is
it to be understood that the rule of comparative negligence
changed or modified the general rule, requiring that the in-
jured party in order to recover for the negligence causing
his injury, must have observed due or ordinary care for his
personal safety, and authorizing him to recover for such in-
juries where he has observed such care."
In the case of Villiage v. 'one, (124 Ill. 133), it
was held, ::r. Justice :.agruder writing the opinion,- " 7.7here
a plaintiff has observed ordinary care; he has, even if
slightly negligent, observed all the care the law requires of
him; and if he is injured by the negligence of another, that
will be held guilty of that degree of negligence for which
the law charges responsibility." The doctrine car.le up again,
for it seems the last blow was not sufficient to kill the
f:<ith which some of the members of the Tllinois bar had in
this rule.
Tn 1894 the case of City v. Dougherty, (153 ill.
163), was settled by :.agruder, J. ITe says,- "The doctrine
of comparative neglir;ence is no longer the law of this State,
and instructions which ignore it, and require as the grounds
of recovery that the plaintiff shall have exercised ordinary
care, and that the defendant shall have been guilty of such
negligence as caused the injury, are correct. This is suf-
ficient, without calling the attention of the jury to any
nice distinctions between different degrees of care or of neg-
ligence."
CILAPTER T'.
q E 0 R G I A
The doctrine of comparative negligence as it was
understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court of Illinois,
does not obtain in the State of Georgia. The rule here dif-
fers both from the general principle of contributory negli-
gence and the doctrine of comparative negligence. Under the
law of contributory negligence, which obtains in all juris-
dictions now except that of Georgia, negligence of the plain-
tiff which is contributory in law, is an absolute defense.
And under the rule of comparative negligence, as obtained in
Illinois, the plaintiff was not precluded from recovering,
even though guilty of contributory negligence, if such negli-
gence, in comparison with defendant's negligence, was slight
and defendant's was gross.
In Georgia the slight negligence of the plaintiff,
although contributory, is not a defense when the negligence
of the defendant is gross, but this contributory negligence
of the plaintiff will go towards cutting down the amount of
his recovery. This, therefore, is not so much a rule of com-
parative negligence to bring about the ultimate liability,
but a comparison of plaintiff's negligence with that of the
defendant's, for the purpose of cutting down plaintiff's re-
covery.
The law of contributory negligence formerly obtain-
ed in this State. (Brown v. '. ay, 17 Ga. 136) In this case
the court held, Lumpkin, J. writing the opinion,- lo main-
tain an action for an injury received from an obstruction in
a highway, two things must concur: An obstruction in the
road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary
care to avoid it, on the part of the plaintiff." The rule
which now obtains in Georgia, or the want of a rule, really,
was first announced by the Supreme Court in F. R. v. Davis,
(27 Ga. 113). This is the first case of importance dealing
with the question of contributory negligence which had come
up before this court. This was an action on the case by Dav-
is, as administrator of the estate of one 7illis Brown,
against the f.acon J Testern R. R. Co., to recover the value
of a negro man slave and a carriage. The slave was killed
and the carriage was destroyed by a collision with defendant's
train of cars. When the case first came up it was decided
according to the accepted doctrine of contributory negligence.
The court laying down the rule:- "In such cases, the plain-
tiff cannot recover if the injury complained of is with his
consent, or caused by his negligence. If both parties,
plaintiff and defendant, are in default, the plaintiff cannot
recover, unless the injury was intentional on the part of the
defendant; or, unless it is impossible with ordinary diligence
for plaintiff to avoid the consequences of defendant's neg-
lect." This is a correct holding and in accordance with the
law laid down in Brown v. 1ay, (17 Ga. 136). The Davis case
came up for a rehearing, (18 Ga. 679), and by this time the
attention of the court had been brought to the holding of the
Davies v. :ann case. The law was laid down in these words,
modifying the rule as first stated:- "The proprietors, when
running their engines over crossings, must use reasonable
care and dili-ence, taking into consideration all the circum-
stances of the case, and wiether there has been negligence or
not, depends upon the facts of each particular case, and the
question is to be decided by the jury; and notwithstanding
the plaintiff may not be without fault, still, if the injury,
could have been prevented in the exercise of proper and rea-
sonable precaution on the part of the defendant, and was not,
the defendant will be liable." Further on Lumpkin, J., who
wrote the opinion, says:- "But it is insisted, that if the
injury in the case resulted from the misconduct of the plain-
tiff's servant, that he cannot recover; and this seems to
have been the rule laid down in Butterfield v. Forrester,
(II East 60), and Luxford v. Lorge, (24 E. C. L. R. 391).
But this doctrine has been modified in later cases, and in
Lurch v. ITurden, (41 E. C. L. R. 422), it was held that the
defendant was liable in an action on the case, though plain-
tiff was a trespasser and contributed to the mischief by his
own act . ..... .e approve of this modification of the princi-
ple and think that it ought to be left to the jury to say
whether, notwithstanding the imprudence of the plaintiff's
servant, the defendant could not in the exercise of reason-
able diligence have prevented the collision."
This case came up for a second rehearing (27 77a. 113).
.hen the case first came up, the holding in ! utterfield v.
Forrester was applied; on the rehearing this doctrine was
modified by the influence of the doctrine of Javies v. Ilann,
and finally, out of the attempt to reconcile the two holdings
and apply them to the facts in this case on its second rehear-
ing the doctrine of comparative negligence was announced and
applied. "Vhen it appears that there verp mutual faults, the
party guilty of the greater wrong or negligence, must be re-
garded as an original aggressor-"' This is the rule by which
the liability is ascertained.
While the Davis case was being litigated, another
action came to issue, which arose out of the same accident.
(The l2inn Case, 19 Ga. 440) In the carriage which was run
over and destroyed by defendant's cars, were four people;
7,alinda "'inn, one of the occupants, was injured, and she
brought this action to recover damages. This case came be-
fore the court before the final settlement of the Davis Case,
axi after the decision of the Davis Case, on its first re-
hearing. Lumpkin, J. wrote this opinion also. He tries to
reconcile the holding in the case of Brown v. , ay, (17 Ga.
136), with the decision in the Davis Case, as held on its
first rehearing. "Is there", says he, "any conflict between
Drown v. !ay and "acon & "Testern R. R. v. Davis? 7e do not
perceive it. The two cases may and do well stand together.
To illustrate. Suppose the Company and Nrs. 'Vinn were both
in fault; and 7 rs. 77inn, plaintiff, using all proper care and
diligence to prevent the contact. In that case the decision
in the Davis Case would have its effect, and the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover. But, again, let us assume,
both are primarily negligent and the defendant company puts
forth all reasonable exertion to escape disaster, but "rrs.
7finn, plaintiff, observes no such care, and madly rushes on
to the collision. In this case the ruling in the Brown v.
.ay case would take effect. In the Davis case we held that
notwithstanding the plaintiff was not free from fault, still,
if the defendant, in the exercise of due care, could have
prevented the injury, they would be responsible. But the
proposition is now made for the first time, suppose the
plaintiff, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, could have
avoided the casualty, conceding there was fault on both sides,
can there be a recovery?" The holding in this - the \inn
case - was that,- "If a collision happens at a crossing of
a railroad and a public highway, and both parties are negli-
gent, and the plaintiff in the exercise of common care and
caution could have avoided the injury, he shall not be en-
titled to recover of the defendant, notwithstanding the de-
fendant was also in fault." The jury found that plaintiff
was not guilty of contributory negligence and :rs. 7finn was
allowed to recover.
This case was decided correctly, in accordance with
the general principles of contributory negligence. Subse-
quently the final hearing of the Davis Case was argued, and
the rule of comparative negligence announced.
The V7inn Case came up for a rehearing, (26 Ga. 250),
and Benning, J., while concurring with the rest of the court
as to the plaintiff's right to recover, dissented from the
decision on the point upon which the appeal was based,- the
amount of the damages. In his dissenting opinion he intro-
duced and discussed that part of the rule relating to the
mitigation of damages, which authorizes a cutting down of the
plaintiff's damages, where he has been in fault, but not guil-
ty of such negligence as will preclude his recovering. Dur-
ing the same year in which the Davis case was finally set-
tled, (1859), the case of 7loders v. i:eath was decided.
In this case was announced the doctrine discussed
by Benning, J. in the dissenting opinion of the rinn case.
Lumpkin, J., who wrote the opinion, says:- "There was a
principle referred to in the case of the Winn girl against
the ' acon @O ?estern R. R. Co., decided at July term 1858 of
this court at this place, which we hold to be sound law, al-
though we did not think it applicable to the facts of that
case. Vhen both parties are in fault, but the defendant most
so, the fault of plaintiff may go in mitigation of damages."
The law of the State of Georgia on this subject is
unsettled. "The latest cases take now one view and now the
other, and we must hear further from the Supreme Court before
there can be formulated anything exactly and explicitly as
the Georgia rule." (Beach, Cont. Neg. Sec. 126; Pro. 27 Ga.
113; 65 Ga. 120; 82 Ga. 109; 78 Ga. 694; Contra the compara-
tive negligence rule, 53 Ga. 488; 56 Ga. 586; 52 Ga. 467; 17
Ga. 136; 18 Ga. 679)
The Supreme Court seems to be kept busy distinguish-
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ing, criticizing and reversing decisions on account of this
unsettled state of the law on this subject. Most of the re-
cent cases seem to have been decided upon the facts peculiar
to them and riot upon principle. The Code of Georgia is in a
measure responsible for the trouble. There are two sections
treating of comparative and contributory negligence.
Section 2972,- "If the plaintiff by ordinary care
could have avoided the consequences to himself, caused by
the defendant's negligence, he is not entitled to recover.
But in other cases the defendant is not relieved, although
the plaintiff may in some way have contributed to the injury
sustained." This section calls for the exercise of ordinary
diligence on the part of the plaintiff and defeats recovery
in absence of that degree of care: but if there be slight
negligence not amounting to lack of ordinary care, the
plaintiff may still recover. This section may be termed the
contributory negligence section with a partial comparative
negligence clause.
The other section of the Code, Sec. 3034,- "1o
person shall recover damages from a railroad company for in-
jury to himself or property, when the same is done by his
consent or is caused by hi-, own negligence. If the com-
plainant and the agents of the company are both at fault, the
former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by
the jury in proportion to the amount of default attributable
to him,L prohibits recovery from railroads when the damage
is by plaintiff's consent or caused by his negligence; but if
both plaintiff and railroad are at fault the amount of dam-
ages should be decreased according to the amount of default
attributable to plaintiff. A case of "tort against tort;
fault against fault; and striking a balance." The section is
ambiguous, in as much as it forbids a recovery when the plain-
ti'f himself causes the injury, and then throws open the gate
for juries to allow damages, but to diminish according to
the amount of default attributable to plaintiff.
In concLusion, I think the law under section 2972,
(78 Ga. 289; 79 Ga. 45; 87 Ga. 6), is as follows:- When the
same degree of care is required of each party and the plain-
tiff fails to come up to the measure of care imposed upon him
then it should be held contributory negligence sufficient to
defeat recovery, and under section 3034 when the degree of
care required of both parties is the same - that is, ordinary
diligence - and the plaintiff is negligent, then there can be
no recovery, the same as in the case of private individuals.
But in cases where the measure of diligence is unequal, where
the degree of care required of the plaintiff is less than
that required of the defendant railroad, then if the plain-
tiff is injured and be slightly at fault, and the defendant
railroad greatly at fault, the plaintiff should recover, but
the amount of recovery should be diminished because of his
negligence. In cases where ordinary diligence is required of
both parties, the plaintiff fails to recover if negligent, even
though the defendant be negligent. But where ordinary dili-
gence is required of plaintiff, and great diligence of the
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defendant, and the plaintiff is negligent, then there may be
a recovery, but on a comparative basis. The negligence of
the plaintiff going toward cutting down the damages.

